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I. Introduction 
Expenditures on housing represent the single largest item of 
expenditures for most households in any economy.  Expenditures on 
housing purchases, in particular, amount to many years of income.  Clearly, 
the housing market and the macroeconomy must be closely related.  The 
purpose of this paper is to present a theory and some evidence for this 
relationship.   
The Hong Kong economy went into tailspin in 1998, declining by 5 per 
cent.  This was unprecedented: there was not a single year of negative 
growth in all of Hong Kong’s history since 1962—the first year official GDP 
growth data is available.  The official explanation was the Asian Financial 
Crisis, but this explanation is not convincing because it is not clear why and 
how an attack on Asian currencies could lead to a crisis that is worse than the 
Cultural Revolution of the sixties or the oil price shocks of the seventies or 
the real banking crises that had actually caused multiple bank failures in the 
sixties and in the eighties. 
Hong Kong’s persistent economic growth prior to 1998 is nothing short 
of a miracle.  Hong Kong’s economy grew at a compound annual rate of 
7.48 percent for four decades up till 1997,1 a record that is not surpassed by 
any other economy.  Even the Chinese Mainland, which boasts very high 
growth and certainly presents another economic miracle, has a history of 
credible economic growth that benefits the masses only since 1979.  What is 
the impetus behind this record growth in Hong Kong?  Why did things 
change so dramatically after 1997?  Was it because Hong Kong’s “exclusive 
franchise” as the linkage between the mainland and the world has eroded or 
expired?2  Hong Kong’s doom, according to Richard Hornik, was because 
China “has made huge strides toward opening itself to the global economy.”  
But China’s opening up did not start from 1997, whereas the economic 
downturn was immediate.  Hong Kong before and after 1997 is like night 
and day.  The dramatic and immediate reversal throws Hornik’s hypothesis 
into doubt. The inability of Hong Kong to revive notwithstanding strong 
pickups in exports is puzzling. 
We need to identify a number of relationships: 
Was Hong Kong’s pre-1998 property market boom a result of underlying 
                                                 
1 Hong Kong started reporting official GDP statistics in 1961.  It never reported a single year of 
negative growth until 1998.  The average compound growth rate over the 1961 to 1997 period 
was 7.48%.   
2 “Who Needs Hong Kong? Fortune, May 2,2002. 
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economic fundamentals?  What explains the movement of the housing 
market then, and what explains the major decline in the housing market after 
1997?  
Does housing market drive domestic demand (defined as domestic 
consumption plus domestic investment)?  Or does domestic demand drive 
housing prices? 
How does the movement of housing prices affect government revenues 
and government expenditures?  What are the causal directions? 
It is said that because Hong Kong is now gripped in a serious deflation, 
real interest rates are very high and that depresses housing prices.  Without 
downplaying the depressing effects of high real interest rates on housing 
prices, we need to find out if it is high real interest rates that caused the 
housing market weakness, or alternatively a decline in housing prices that 
triggered the deflation and caused high real interest rates. 
We found evidence for a property price bubble that began to emerge 
around the second quarter of 1996 and peaked in the third quarter of 1997.  
Roughly speaking, around 23 per cent of the peak price in 1997 could be due 
to the bubble.  Thus, most of the price increases that took place prior to 
1998 was more a reflection of Hong Kong’s prosperity, low taxes, and wealth 
than a speculative bubble.  Given a regime of low tax rates, social and 
political stability, free market institutions, the respect for the rule of law, and 
benefiting from rapid growth on the mainland, housing prices had been 
buoyed up by strong economic growth.   
A statistical model shows that exports growth was really the driving 
force behind housing prices.  Alternative time series models, using the 
autoregressive distributive lag (ARDL) framework as well as the 
Granger-Johansen cointegration framework,3 show that a model with exports, 
interest rates, and the inflation rate as key variables track housing prices 
really well.  It can be used to identify the bubble and predict much of the 
signficant price decline after 1997.  The model also predicts that housing 
prices should have peaked in 1996 and should have picked up well before 
2002.   
The inability of the housing market to pick up from 2001 as predicted by 
our model may be attributable to a policy to produce a major increase in the 
supply of housing implemented after 1997, and may also be partly 
attributable to a structural break reducing the “pull” effect of exports for 
                                                 
3 Results from the Johansen/Granger model are similar and not reported on space considerations. 
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housing prices, which was found to have occurred from 1998Q1.  We will 
offer some discussion about the possible causes behind this structural break. 
Because of space limitations, readers may refer to Ho, Haurin, and Wong 
(2003) and Ho, Wong, and Tse (2003) for further evidence about possible 
explanations for the structural break.    
It is common for people to say that housing price bubble was partly due 
to a provision in the Annex to the Sino-British Joint Declaration, which 
restricted the annual land grant to no more than 50 hectares (excluding land 
to be granted to the Hong Kong Housing Authority for public rental housing) 
unless a relaxation to the limit is approved by the Land Commission 
consisting of equal members from the British and Chinese sides.4  We will 
present evidence that such a restriction notwithstanding, there is no apparent 
shortage of housing prior to 1997.  The housing market was essentially in 
balance during the run-up to the handover. Housing prices can rise when the 
housing market is in a moving equilibrium, much as wages and salaries can 
rise when the labor market is in a moving equilibrium. 
We do not dispute that housing prices in Hong Kong in 1997 were due 
for a major correction.  Indeed our model predicted the major correction.  
But without the structural break and the policy-driven increase in housing 
supply the housing market would have picked up long time ago.  Further, it 
is likely that government intervention to curb speculation in 1994 may well 
have played a role in the formation of the bubble prior to 1997. Thus we 
conclude that Hong Kong’s demise was home-made and indeed caused by a 
miscarriage of housing policy, in particular inappropriate intervention in the 
market to curb demand during the 1994-95 episode and then to boost supply 
after 1998, and accentuated by the launch of the Tenants Purchase Scheme 
(TPS) that offered even well-to-do sitting tenants the opportunity to buy their 
subsidized rental flats at deeply discounted prices.   
An important and extremely robust result is that domestic demand is 
always driven by the housing price index.  Causation does not run from 
domestic demand to housing price.  This explains why the domestic 
economy fell so sharply after 1997, and why increases in unemployment was 
concentrated in the domestic sector such as finance and real estate, retail sales, 
and construction and decoration.  However, there is a bi-direction effect 
between employment weakness and housing market weakness. 
We found that although Hong Kong’s exports growth declined after 
1997, the degree of decline was in line with that for the world as a whole and 
                                                 
4 See http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/~pchksar/JD/jd-full1.htm 
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actually smaller than that experienced by such economies as South Korea, the 
United Kingdom, and the U.S.  There was little evidence that the integration 
with the Mainland played an important role in Hong Kong’s decline, and little 
evidence that the opening up of China caused the Hong Kong economy to 
shrink.  The decline of the economy came just too suddenly for Hornick’s 
hypothesis to hold, given that the opening up of China and the integration 
with the Mainland had gone on for a long time and continuously. 
We found the plunge in property prices the key to the huge budget 
deficit that emerged after 1997.  We present evidence that the Hong Kong 
fiscal system was highly dependent on land-based revenues and indeed was 
probably the closest model to the Henry George “single tax” ideal.  Henry 
George (1839-1897) was a social reformer who argued that the only tax 
(hence “single tax”) that is required to finance the working of a government 
is a tax on land rent.  By eliminating taxes on incomes and all other taxes, 
the incentive to invest and to work will be enhanced.  The progress of 
society will be reflected in higher land values, and the government can tax 
land to fund all worthwhile government expenditures.  It was no accident 
that Hong Kong’s land cost was probably the world’s highest and Hong 
Kong’s taxes were probably the lowest in the world prior to 1998.   
Section II will provide some background to the Hong Kong housing 
market, the policies in the 1994-95, and the policies under the Tung 
Chee-hwa Administration. Section III will present the theory and evidence 
about what drives Hong Kong’s housing prices and the relationship between 
domestic demand and the housing market.  Section IV will present the 
evidence about fiscal policy and the housing market.  Section V will 
examine the relationship between real interest rates and the housing market.  
Finally, Section VI will provide the conclusions. 
II. Hong Kong’s Housing Market and Policies 
Public housing has traditionally played a key role in Hong Kong’s 
housing market.  To deal with the rapidly expanding population, Governor 
MacLehose announced in October 1972 an unprecedented public housing 
programme.  72 public housing estates were to be constructed, to provide 
decent housing to a total of 1.8 million people.  These estates offer cheap 
rents to qualified means-tested households.  Then in 1978, the Home 
Ownership Scheme (HOS) was launched, offering an opportunity for those 
who were not qualified for low cost rental housing to buy their own flats at 
prices lower than private flats.  Most buyers of HOS housing were public 
rental tenants, who were given a more favorable quota than others in periodic 
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lotteries set up to allocate the limited supply of new HOS flats among eligible 
buyers. 
Because of continuous economic growth and inflation, Hong Kong’s 
housing prices had been climbing secularly for decades, though not smoothly.  
Particularly after 1987, following the implementation of a policy to make the 
richer public housing tenants pay higher rent, participation among public 
housing tenants in the housing market rose.  A priori, one could predict that 
this inflow of cash into the housing market would drive housing prices as 
well as housing transactions up.  By 1992/93, it was found that 13 per cent 
of public housing tenants owned a flat and as much as 24 per cent of housing 
transactions were due to purchase by public housing tenants (Hong Kong 
Housing Authority,1993).  Subsequently, a Task Force on Land Supply and 
Property Prices found 10% of sale and purchase agreements presented for 
stamping in the two years between February 1992 and March 1994 involved 
short-term resales.  Deciding that there was prima facie evidence for 
hoarding the Task Force recommended a series of anti-speculation measures 
in June 1994.  Among such measures, the initial deposit was to be fixed at 
10% of the purchase price and 5% would be forfeited if the purchaser fails to 
sign the formal sale and purchase agreement or enters into a Cancellation 
Agreement with the developer.  Stamp duties were also made payable at the 
time a provisional sale and purchase agreement was signed and not at the 
time the transaction was completed.   
Apart from worrying about speculation, the government also had a long 
history of worrying about the homeownership rate.  In 1987, The Long Term 
Housing Strategy: A Policy Statement, already made it clear that the 
government wanted to encourage home ownership.  Since then there had 
been a number of attempts to sell public housing to tenants, but they had 
failed because they were not attractive.  Tenants’ tenure had been protected 
and had been transferrable to future generations, while worn-down estates 
were automatically replaced with modern ones.  Tenants therefore needed 
much more sweetener to find such schemes attractive.  The Tenants 
Purchase Scheme (TPS), announced in December 1997, finally made tenants 
the irresistable offer of as much as 88 % off the estimated market value and 
permission to resell after two years.  TPS would play a strategic role in Mr. 
Tung Chee-hwa’s vision of increasing homeownership from 50% to 70% in 
ten years, as announced in his first policy address of October 1997.   
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The scheme immediately reduced the attractiveness of Home Ownership 
Scheme flats, which looked ridiculously expensive in comparison.5  HOS 
homeowners suddenly found a dearth of buyers.  Turnover in the 
second-hand market dropped precipitously, and developers had to by-pass 
existing homeowners in order to find buyers.  After they have exhausted one 
“crop” of buyers, in the following year they must further cut prices in order to 
reach buyers with lower purchasing power.  This was why home prices kept 
falling even in 2000, when economic growth was actually quite high. 
Interpreting the run-up in property prices prior to 1997 as resulting from 
a shortage, Mr. Tung in 1997 announced a new policy of increasing the 
supply of homes to 85000 unit a year (from an average of about 53,000 units 
a year over the 1987-1997 period).  From 1998 on through late 1999 the 
government used every means within its control to boost housing supply.6  
The surge in housing supply after 2000 reflected the result of this policy, 
which was seen as the natural response to the surge in housing prices prior to 
1997. 
II. A Model of Housing Price Determination in a Small Open Economy 
and the Exports Multiplier on Domestic Economy 
A. Model 
In principle, many factors determine housing prices, and they include 
both demand side and supply side factors.  These factors include 
demographic variables, incomes, interest rates, mortgage loan ratios, and 
expectations about inflation, expectations about supply and income trends, 
and the completion rate, etc.  However, when the policy environment is 
stable, and when the housing market is more or less in equilibrium, incomes 
and interest rates should be the predominant factors.  Since in an open 
economy incomes are closely tied to exports, we hypothesize that exports and 
interest rates were the fundamental variables driving housing prices.7  Table 
                                                 
5 For this hypothesis to carry weight, public housing tenants have to be active in the housing 
market prior to the announcement of the TPS.  This was vindicated as a survey by the Housing 
Authority in 1992/93 found that public housing tenants were responsible for 24 per cent of housing 
trasactions.  Watanabe(1998) found public housing tenants had huge savings compared to private 
housing tenants or owners. 
6 Mr. Tung in an interview with reporters in June 2000 unexpectedly made the statement that the 
85000 a year production target was no longer government policy.  Earlier on, a story in Apple 
Daily(July 6, 1999) reported that land lease conversions and land exchange in the first half of the 
year would provide 16785 housing units, a new record in recent history.  Plot ratios were also 
increased over the years. 
7 We exclude other sources of incomes on the ground that these are endogenously induced. 
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1 presents a comparison between the housing stock and the number of 
households in Hong Kong from 1987 to 2001.  It provides some evidence 
that the housing market prior to 1997 was more or less in equilibrium 
notwithstanding the run-up in prices. 
Table 1 : Number of Households and Housing Stock (1987-2001) 
Thousands 
    Private Housing     Public Housing    Total Housing    
 No. of 
Households 
Private 
Housing
Increase 
in private 
housing 
Subsidized 
Sale Flats 
Public 
Rental 
Housing
Increase 
in 
public 
housing
Increase 
in 
Housing 
Stock 
Total 
stock 
Households 
minus 
Housing 
Stock 
1987 1496.1 770 - 79 580 - - 1429 67.1 
1988 1532.6 804 34 84 596 21 55 1484 48.6 
1989 1549.0 832 28 94 620 34 64 1548 1.0 
1990 1559.0 864 32 114 651 51 82 1630 -71.0 
1991 1603.1 884 20 131 667 33 52 1682 -78.9 
1992 1640.0 919 35 147 680 29 62 1744 -104.0 
1993 1677.7 946 27 162 673 8 37 1781 -103.3 
1994 1729.1 962 16 182 679 26 41 1822 -92.9 
1995 1783.0 1003 41 192 689 20 62 1884 -101.0 
1996 1864.5 1030 27 210 693 22 48 1932 -67.5 
1997 1922.8 1040 10 224 698 19 29 1961 -38.2 
1998 1961.5 1056 16 242 706 26 42 2004 -42.5 
1999 1998.9 1072 16 288 682 22 38 2040 -41.1 
2000 2037.0 1099 27 327 688 45 72 2114 -77.0 
2001 2078.4 1153 54 377 694 56 110 2224 -145.6 
Sources: Data on the number of households are obtained from “Hong Kong Social and Economic Trends, Census 
and Statistics Department, various years.  Data on the housing stock can be downloaded from 
http://www.cityu.edu.hk/hkhousing/hs/figures/index.htm  “Private housing” include privatized public housing/HOS 
flats.  Data on the number of households are the averages of the statistics for the four quarters of the years obtained 
from the General Household Survey. Stock of permanent residential flats are as at end March. 
 
If exports are the main driving force behind housing price, and if 
housing price movements in turn drive domestic demand, we will have a 
model about an “exports multiplier” linking exports to domestic demand.  In 
this picture the housing market provides a “transmission mechanism” 
whereby the primary engine of exports gives rise to the secondary effects of 
“non-basic” sector activities. 
These basic relations can be summarized by the following equations: 
LnPPI = ?1 + ?1LnEX + ?PR + λ INFL + ?t     -------------------- (1) 
(?1>0, ?<0 and λ > 0) 
 
LnD = ?2 + ?2 LnPPI +?t                       --------------------(2) 
(?2>0) 
where PPI is the property (housing) price index, EX is total exports, PR is 
prime rate and INFL is inflation rate. 
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To establish the long-run relations for these equations, we employ the 
autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) approach to cointegration introduced 
by Pesaran et. al. (1996). This approach, unlike the Johansen’s procedure 
which requires all the series are integrated of the same order, provides an 
alternative for examining the cointegrating relation of the underlying 
variables regardless of whether the series are I (0) or I (1) and so we can 
dispense with the need for pre-testing for unit roots. The error correction 
version (EC) of the ARDL model for Equation (1) and (2) are given by:  
ε+θθθθ
∆∑λ∆∑γ∆∑β∆∑δα∆
−−−−
−=−=−=−=
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Another advantage of the ARDL framework over the Johansen approach 
is that there is no need to impose a uniform lag structure in the error 
correction model.   
The ARDL approach consists of several steps. To begin with, we carried 
out a stability tests for investigating the existence of a long run relationship. 
The null hypotheses for the statistical tests, namely that no cointegrating 
relationship exists between the variables, can be stated as follows: 
Ho1: ?1=?2=?3=?4= 0 
Ho2: ?5=?6= 0 
The null hypotheses can be tested by the F-statistic. Note that this 
statistic has a non-standard distribution irrespective of whether the series are I 
(0) or I (1). Two sets of asymptotic critical values (CV) - the lower bound CV 
(assuming all the variables are I (0) and the upper bound CV (assuming all 
the variables are I (1) ), have been computed by Pesaran et. al. (1996). If the 
computed F-statistic for the test lies above the upper bound, then the null of 
no cointegration can be rejected and we can conclude that a long-run 
relationship between the variables does exist. If the test statistic falls below 
the lower bound, then the null cannot be rejected. If the test statistic falls in 
between the bounds, then the result is inconclusive.  Once the existence of 
long-run relationship is confirmed, the ARDL model is then applied to 
estimate the coefficients of this long-run relation and we can derive the 
associated ARDL error correction model based on different lag selection 
criterion. 
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B.  Estimation Results: 
1. Relationship between Property Price (LnPPI), Export Performance 
(LnEX), Prime Rate (PR), and Inflation (INFL), 1984Q1 – 1994Q2  
In the first instance, we estimate the parameters in the basic housing 
price model for the interval 1984 to 1994:Q2.  This is a period with stable 
monetary regime, a period of relative political stability after the signing of the 
Sino-British Joint Declaration removing much of the  uncertainty about 
Hong Kong’s future, one with relative balance in supply and demand, and 
relative stability in housing policy.8 
As the estimation results may be sensitive to different lag orders in VAR, 
to avoid this, we try different lags (2, 4 ,6 and 8 lags on the first difference of 
each variable) and see whether or not these could yield consistent results. As 
can be seen in the Table 2.1, the computed F-statistic F (LnPPI | LnEX, PR, 
INFL) = 5.00 when lags = 8 when the PPI is taken as the dependent variable. 
Since the value exceeds the upper bound of the critical value bound, we can 
reject the null of no long-run relationship between LnPPI, LnEX, PR and 
INFL.  
In the next stage, we have to determine the lag order of ARDL model. 
The maximum lag orders set at 6 and the optimal lag structure is determined 
by the AIC information criteria. The selected ARDL model is (6, 0, 6, 0). The 
analysis then moves to estimate the coefficients of the long-run relationship 
and also the associated ARDL error correction model. The estimated 
coefficients are reported in the Table 2.2. All the explanatory variables carry a 
significant expected sign. The estimate of the error correction model is 
reported in the Table 2.3. The error term is negative and highly significant 
which also confirms our earlier findings that cointegration exists between the 
variables. 
Using the parameters estimated for this period, and inserting the realized 
values for total exports, inflation rates, and interest rates, both the fitted and 
the forecast housing price indices from mid 1984 through 2002 are presented 
in Figure 1. Amazingly, we found that the model forecasts housing prices 
quite well. We also found that there was apparently a bubble from 1996 to 
1997, which appears to have emerged precisely because housing prices were 
suppressed prior to 1996. We discover that housing prices should have 
peaked in 1996 at a much lower level. Some 23 per cent of the peak price in 
1997 may represent the bubble. Moreover, housing prices should have 
                                                 
8 Throughout this period, an annual 50 hectare land sale limit applies, unless special approval to 
relax the limit was given by the Land Commission. 
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bottomed out in 2001 and rebounded strongly with the recovery of exports. 
Housing prices in mid 2003 should have been some 40 per cent above 
realized values. 
Figure 1. Fitted Values and Dynamic Forecasts for the Level of PPI
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Table 2.1 : F-Statistics for Testing the Existence of a Long-Run Relationship Between 
Property Price, Total Export and Prime Interest Rate, 1984Q1 to 1994Q2 
Dependent Variables: Lag=2 Lag=4 Lag=6 Lag=8 
?LnPPI 1.5841 1.3143 2.6849 4.9991** 
Note:  
1. The critical value bounds for the test are 3.79-4.35 at the 95% significance level, which are given in 
Table C1.iii (with an unrestricted intercept and no trend; number of regressors=3), Shin and Smith 
(1999). 
2. ** denotes 95% significance level and ? denotes first difference. 
 
Table 2.2 : Estimated Long-Run Coefficients (Dependent variable: LnPPI) 
Regressors Coefficient (t-ratio) 
Intercept -8.1132 (-8.2318)*** 
LnEX 1.0720 (13.0848)*** 
PR -0.4547 (-2.3117)** 
INFL 0.0429 (2.6215)** 
Note: 
1. Optimal Lag: ARDL (6,0,6,0) selected based on AIC Information criteria  
2.  *** denotes 1% significance level 
Sample Period:  
84Q1-97Q4 
Forecasted Period: 
98Q1-02Q3 
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Table 2.3 : Error Correction Representation of ARDL Model  
(Dependent variable:?LnPPIt) 
Regressors Coefficient (t-ratio) 
Intercept -2.8177 (-4.0731)*** 
?LnPPIt-1 
?LnPPIt-2 
?LnPPIt-3 
?LnPPIt-4 
?LnPPIt-5 
?PR 
?INFL 
?INFLt-1 
?INFLt-2 
?INFLt-3 
?INFLt-4 
?INFLt-5 
?lnEX 
ECMt-1 
0.5014 (2.9518)*** 
-0.1792 (-0.9082) 
0.3968 (1.8762)* 
-0.2535 (-1.2435) 
-0.3209 (-1.7659)* 
-0.0158 (-2.0824) 
-0.0089 (-0.4357) 
0.0047 (0.1922) 
-0.0456 (-2.1219)** 
0.0083 (0.3920) 
0.1470 (0.6966) 
-0.0397 (-2.2290)** 
0.3723 (4.2933)*** 
-0.3473 (-4.1336)*** 
Note:  
1. Optimal Lag: ARDL (6,0,6,0) selected based on AIC Information criteria  
2. *, ** and *** denotes 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively 
2. Estimation Results with Policy Variables Built In: 1984Q1 – 2001Q1 
In this section, we will try to identify if there was a structural change in 
the statistical relationship between housing prices and exports that occurred 
some time between the Asian Financial Crisis and the end of 1998 to the 
underlying relationship determining housing prices.  To do this we avoid 
making any prior assumptions about whether a structural change had 
occurred and when it had occurred.  We just let the data tell the story.  
Since we know that considerable over-supply emerged after the first quarter 
of 2001 we end the estimation period to avoid invalidating the model, since 
as we have explained, the analysis presumes that demand and supply are 
roughly in balance. 
To test if there was a structural change in the statistical relationships that 
occurred during or after transition to Chinese sovereignty we introduce an 
intercept dummy variable “D” (all values being equal to zero prior to the 
structural change and equal to zero after the structural change) and an 
interactive dummy variables (a binary 0,1 dummy multiplied to key 
explanatory variables) in the ARDL model..  The coefficient on the intercept 
dummy would capture any shift in the relationship.  The coefficients on the 
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interactive variables would capture any change in the slopes of the key 
explanatory variables.   
Table 2.4 : F-Statistics for Testing the Existence of a Long-Run Relationship Between 
Property Price on the one hand, and Total Export and Prime Interest Rate (with interactive 
dummy), on the other hand, 1984Q1 to 2001Q1  
Dependent 
Variable: 
Lag=2 Lag=4 Lag=6 Lag=8 
?LnPPI 3.9049 2.9570 9.2365** 8.5862** 
Note:   
1.  The critical value bounds for the test are 4.04 – 4.78 at the 90% significance level, 6.84 – 7.84 at the 99% 
significance level which are given in Table C1.iii (with an unrestricted intercept and no trend; number 
of regressors=1), Shin and Smith (1999). 
2.  * and *** denote 90 and 99% significance level respectively and ? denotes first difference. 
3.  D98Q1 (prior 98 Q1=0, =1 onwards), LnEX * D98Q1 are included in the model. 
 
As can be seen in the Table 2.4, the null hypothesis of no cointegration 
can be rejected for the lag = 6 and 8 when LnPPI is the dependent variable. 
Since the value exceeds the upper bound of the critical value bound 
(particularly when a higher order of lag is included in the model), it indicates 
that the inclusion of the interactive variables retain the long run relation 
between the LnPPI, LnEX, PR and INFL. 
Without prejudging the timing of a structural change that may occur, and 
mainly for illustration purposes, Table 2.5 and Table 2.6 present the estimates 
for the long run coefficients and the error correction model when the dummy 
variables are switched from 0 to unity in the first quarter of 1998.  The 
estimated long-run coefficients and the error correction representation have 
been selected by the AIC information criteria (the maximum lag orders set at 
6).  Coefficients on LnEX and PR carry the significant expected sign, and 
the error term in the EC-ARDL model is negative and highly significant 
which also confirms our earlier findings that cointegration exists between the 
variables.  As Table 2.5 shows, the estimated coefficients for the export 
interactive dummies is significant indicating that some structural change has 
reduced the positive effects of exports growth on housing prices.  We must 
now conduct a timing test to reveal whether 1998 Quarter One was indeed the 
time a structural change occurred and explore the reasons causing the 
structural change. 
14 
Table 2.5 : Estimated Long-Run Coefficients (Dependent variable: LnPPI) 
Regressors Coefficient (t-ratio) 
Intercept -8.2364 (-17.6958)*** 
PR -0.0527 (-3.7096)*** 
INFL 0.0105 (1.2329) 
LnEX 1.1168 (31.6069)*** 
D98Q1 13.4904 (1.6832)* 
LnEX * D98Q1 -1.0546 (-1.7029)* 
Note:   
1.  Optimal Lag: ARDL (4, 0, 4, 6) selected based on AIC Information criteria  
2.  * and *** denotes 10& and 5% significance level respectively 
 
Table 2.6 : Error Correction Representation of ARDL Model  
(Dependent variable:?LnPPIt) 
Regressors Coefficient (t-ratio) 
Intercept -3.2554 (-4.8622)*** 
?LnPPIt-1 
?LnPPIt-2 
?LnPPIt-3 
?PR 
?INFL 
?INFLt-1 
?INFLt-2 
?INFLt-3 
?lnEX 
?lnEXt-1 
?lnEXt-2 
?lnEXt-3 
?lnEXt-4 
?lnEXt-5 
0.5376 (4.3806) 
0.2391 (1.54131) 
0.1766 (1.3336) 
-0.0208 (-2.8030)*** 
-0.0587 (-2.7256)*** 
0.0588 (2.4474)** 
0.0042 (0.1587) 
-0.0260 (-1.3848) 
-1.1149(-0.5510) 
-0.6283 (-2.5454)** 
0.2453 (1.0486) 
-0.0492 (-0.2162) 
-0.7518 (-3.2528)*** 
-0.3476 (-1.4823) 
?D98Q1 
?LnEX * D98Q1 
ECMt-1 
5.3320 (1.5479) 
-0.4168 (-1.5658) 
-0.3953 (-5.0971)*** 
Note:  
1. Optimal Lag: ARDL (4, 0, 4, 6) selected based on AIC Information criteria  
2. ** and *** denotes 5% and 1% significance level respectively 
 
Under this timing test, we switch the dummy variables from zero to 
unity in different quarters, and observe the changes in the coefficients 
estimates and the test statistics.  Table 2.7 shows an obvious jump in the t 
statistic between 97Q4 and 98Q1 and a discrete sizeable increase in the key 
coefficients, suggesting that something rather sudden occurred shortly before 
1998 Quarter One.  The sudden nature of the change suggests some kind of 
policy-triggered “regime shift.” 
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As it happens, a major housing policy change, in the form of the Tenants 
Purchase Scheme, was announced on December 8.  Given that public 
housing tenants had been active in the home purchase market, the 
attractiveness of the TPS can indeed be very disruptive of the housing market, 
as private homeowners who had been dependent on them to buy their 
properties so they could trade up could no longer do so after they disappeared.  
Table 2.7 shows the results of this timing test.  It shows that the best 
goodness of fit and the best test statistics occur when the dummies switch to 
unity in 1998Q1. 
Table 2.7 : Timing Test With Dummies Switching to Unity in Different Quarters 
Quarter with Value of 
Dummy Switching to 
Unity 
Intercept 
Dummy, D 
LnEX * D Adjusted R2 in ECM 
model 
1997Q1 -9.9555 
(-0.6221) 
0.7909 
(0.6367) 
0.6425 
1997 Q2 0.9158 
(0.0726) 
-0.0758 
(-0.0778) 
0.5990 
1997 Q3 6.6088 
(0.6014) 
-0.5204 
(-0.6128) 
0.6143 
1997 Q4 13.7312 
(1.3308) 
-1.0762 
(-1.3500) 
0.6300 
1998 Q1 13.4904  
(1.6832)* 
-1.0546  
(-1.7029)* 
0.6604 
1998 Q2 12.8367 
(1.3410) 
-0.9982 
(-1.3486) 
0.6139 
1998 Q3 12.7548 
(1.4839) 
-0.9998 
(-1.5053) 
0.6325 
Note: Figures are estimated coefficients and the adjusted R2 for the error correction models. T statistics 
are in brackets. D is a dummy variable that switches to unity in the quarter on the left column. 
 
In addition, using the parameters estimated, and setting the time-based 
dummy variable to zero, we can project what the housing prices would have 
been, had policies triggering the structural break not been implemented. The 
results of this exercise is presented in Figure 2. Just as before we predict a 
major decline in housing prices early 1998 but housing prices should have 
picked up, especially after 2001.  The failure of housing prices to pick up 
notwithstanding a rebound in exports may be partly due to over supply after 
2001 and partly due to the diminution of the “exports multiplier” after 1998.  
For the first quarter of 2001, forecast prices without the structural change 
were 17.3 per cent higher than actual prices.  After 2001, the excess supply 
would further weigh down upon actual prices, while the strong exports would 
lift up housing prices, but this is not shown in the diagram. 
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Figure 2. Actual and Forecase Value of PPI
(Using Dummy Variable), 1984-2001
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Note: Housing prices are in their natural scale.  Anti-logarithms have been taken. 
 
3. Relationship between Domestic Demand (LnD) and Property Price 
(LnPPI), 1984Q1 – 2002Q3 
It is important to identify the direction of causality between domestic 
demand and property price. As can be seen in Table 3.1, the null hypothesis 
of no long run relationship can be rejected, under the ARDL approach, for the 
lags=2 when LnD is the dependent variable. Since the value exceeds the 
upper bound of the critical value bound, we can reject the null of no long-run 
relationship between the LnD and LnPPI.  On the other hand, when we turn 
the LnPPI around to serve as the dependent variable all the corresponding 
F-statistics fall below the lower bound critical value (4.94 and 4.04 at 5% and 
10% significance level respectively). Therefore the null hypothesis of 
non-existence of cointegration cannot be rejected. The above results indicate 
that only F (LnD | LnPPI) is significant. A long-run-relationship exists with 
the LnD as the dependent variable and housing price index (in logarthims) 
LnPPI as the driving variables for the explanation of LnD.  
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Table 3.1 : F-Statistics for Testing the Existence of a Long-Run Relationship Between 
Private Domestic Demand and Property Price, 1984Q1 to 2002Q3 
Dependent 
Variables: 
Lag=2 Lag=4 Lag=6 Lag=8 
?LnD 4.83* 3.46 3.17 3.33 
?LnPPI 1.70 0.65 0.32 0.75 
Note:  
1. The critical value bounds for the test are 4.94 – 5.73 at the 95% significance level and 4.04 - 4.78 at the 
90% significance level, which are given in Table C1.iii (with an unrestricted intercept and no trend; 
number of regressor=1), Shin and Smith (1999). 
2. * and ** denotes 10% and 95% significance level respectively. 
 
Table 3.2 : Estimated Long-Run Coefficients (Dependent variable: LnD) 
Regressors Coefficient (t-ratio) 
Intercept 8.6597 (22.1448)*** 
LnPPI 0.6878 (9.9381)*** 
Note:  
1. Optimal Lag: ARDL (2, 0) selected based on AIC Information criteria  
2. *** denotes 1% significance level 
 
Table 3.3  Error Correction Representation of ARDL Model (Dependent variable:?LnDt) 
Regressors Coefficient (t-ratio) 
Intercept 0.7668 (3.7053)*** 
?LnDt-1 
?LnPPI 
ECMt-1 
-0.3619 (-3.6092)*** 
0.2430 (3.6875)*** 
-0.0886 (-3.4313)*** 
Note:  
1. Optimal Lag: ARDL (2, 0) selected based on AIC Information criteria  
2. *** denotes 1% significance level respectively 
 
The estimated long-run coefficients and the error correction 
representation selected by the AIC information criteria are reported in the 
Table 3.2 and 3.3 respectively (the maximum lag orders set at 3). The LnPPI 
carries the significant expected sign (Table 2.2), and the error term in the 
EC-ARDL model is negative and highly significant (Table 2.3) which also 
confirms our earlier findings that cointegration exists between the variables. 
The size of the error term is 0.09 which indicates that once the domestic 
demand has experienced an external shock, it takes around 2.5 to 3 years for 
the domestic demand to return its equilibrium. 
A related result is the relationship between employment changes and 
housing price movements.  A bi-directional relationship was found using the 
Johansen-Granger technique and was reported in Ho, Tse, and Wong (2003). 
18 
III. Relationship between Fiscal Variables and Housing Price 
Two simple hypotheses to be tested is whether housing prices drive 
government expenditures, and whether housing prices drive government 
revenues.  Mathematically, that housing prices drive government 
expenditures and government revenues can be represented by the following 
equations: 
 
LnG = ?3 + ?3 LnPPI +?t                 --------------------(5) 
(?3>0) 
 
LnGR =?4 + ?4 LnPPI +?t                 --------------------(6) 
(?4>0) 
 
These relationships are estimated under the ARDL framework.  The 
above long run relationship is estimated by the ARDL model.  For the 
government revenue relation, we need to add two dummies variables (1999=1, 
other=0 and 2000=1, other=0) to capture the effect of one-time increase of 
government revenue resulting from sale of stocks in 1999 and 2000.9 The 
data are annual from 1984 to 2001.  
Table 4.1 : F-Statistics for Testing the Existence of a Long-Run Relationship Between 
Government Expenditures and Property Price, 1984Q1 to 2002Q3 
Dependent 
Variables: 
Lag=2 Lag=4 Lag=6 Lag=8 
?LnG 5.21* 1.37 0.85 0.56 
?LnPPI 1.99 2.10 2.77 2.46 
Note:   
1.  The critical value bounds for the test are 4.94 – 5.73 at the 95% significance level and 4.04 - 4.78 at the 90% 
significance level, which are given in Table C1.iii (with an unrestricted intercept and no trend; number of 
regressor=1), Shin and Smith (1999). 
2.  * denotes 10% significance level respectively. 
 
Table 4.2 : Estimated Long-Run Coefficients (Dependent Variable: LnG) 
Regressors Coefficient (t-ratio) 
Intercept 5.7429 (14.590)*** 
LnPPI 0.9108 (12.1273)*** 
Note:  
1. *** denotes 1% significance level 
2. Optimal Lag: ARDL (2, 0) selected based on AIC Information criteria 
                                                 
9 The HKSAR government spent some 120 billion dollars in the summer of 1998 buying stocks to 
counteract what was described as the “double play” of some hedge funds: making money from 
index futures by depressing stock prices.  This yielded a huge profit as the government sold them 
in stages to Hong Kong people in the form of a “tracker fund.” 
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Table 4.3 : Error Correction Representation of ARDL Model (Dependent variable:?LnGt) 
Regressors Coefficient (t-ratio) 
Intercept 0.4803 (4.7506)*** 
?LnGt-1 
?LnPPI 
ECMt-1 
-0.3449 (-3.2888)*** 
0.0762 (4.2381)*** 
-0.0836 (-4.6156)*** 
Note:  
1.  Optimal Lag: ARDL (2, 0) selected based on AIC Information criteria  
2.  *** denotes 1% significance level respectively 
 
As can be seen in Table 4.1, the null hypothesis of no long term 
relationship between government expenditures and housing prices can be 
rejected for the lags = 2 when LnG is the dependent variable.  When we then 
turn the LnPPI as the dependent variable and then test the joint significance 
of the lagged level variables in the EC version of the ARDL model, on the 
contrary, Table 4.1 shows that all corresponding F-statistic fall below the 
lower bound critical value (4.94 and 4.04 at 5% and 10% significance level 
respectively).  We cannot reject the null hypothesis of non-existence of 
cointegration.  Thus only F (LnG | LnPPI) is significant.  Housing price 
movements are an important determinant of government expenditures and 
this relation holds in the long term.  
The estimated long-run coefficients and the error correction 
representation selected by the AIC information criteria are reported in the 
Table 4.2 and 4.3 respectively (the maximum lag orders set at 2). The LnPPI 
carries the significant expected sign, and the error term in the EC-ARDL 
model is negative and highly significant which also confirms our earlier 
findings that cointegration exists between the variables. The size of the error 
term is 0.08 which indicates that once the LnG experiences an external shock, 
it takes around 2.5 to 3 years for the domestic demand to return its 
equilibrium. 
We now turn to the relation between government revenues and housing 
prices. As can be seen in the Table 5.1, the null hypothesis can be rejected for 
the lag =4 when LnGR is the dependent variable. Since the value exceeds the 
upper bound of the critical value bound (at 10% significant level), we can 
reject the null of no long-run relationship between the LnGR and LnPPI. 
Similarly, we then turn the LnPPI as the dependent variable and then test the 
joint significance of the lagged level variables in the EC version of the ARDL 
model. The results in Table 5.1 show that all corresponding F-statistic fall 
below the upper bound critical value (4.78 at 10% significance level), and 
therefore the null hypothesis of non-existence of cointegration cannot be 
rejected. The above results indicate that only F (LnGR | LnPPI) is significant 
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and therefore there exists a unique long-run-relationship when the LnGR as 
the dependent variable and LnPPI can be treated as the “long-run” forcing 
variables for the explanation of LnGR.  
The estimated long-run coefficients and the error correction 
representation selected by the AIC information criteria are reported in the 
Table 5.2 and 5.3 respectively (the maximum lag orders set at 4). The 
coefficient for LnPPI carries the expected positive sign and is statistically 
significant giving an estimated long run elasticity of revenue with respect to 
the housing price index at 0.80.  The error term in the EC-ARDL model is 
negative and highly significant confirming our hypothesis that cointegration 
exists between the variables. Moreover, based on the estimated ARDL model 
(Table 6.3), we plot the actual and fitted values of the change in lnGR in 
Figure 3. We can see that the model fits quite well within the sample period. 
Figure 3. Plot of Actual and Fitted Value
(Change in LnGR), 1984 - 2001
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Table 5.1 : F-Statistics for Testing the Existence of a Long-Run Relationship Between 
Government Revenue (LnGR) and Property Price (LnPPI), 1984 to 2001 (Annual Data) 
Dependent 
Variables: 
Lag=1 Lag=2 Lag=3 Lag=4 
?LnGR 0.5548 1.9868 1.8528 5.5478* 
?LnPPI 1.0665 1.7969 2.7855 4.1540 
Note:  
1. The critical value bounds for the test are 4.94 – 5.73 at the 95% significance level and 4.04 - 4.78 at the 
90% significance level, which are given in Table C1.iii (with an unrestricted intercept and no trend; 
number of regressor=1), Shin and Smith (1999). 
2. * denotes 10% significance level. 
 
Table 5.2 : Estimated Long-Run Coefficients (Dependent Variable: LnGR) 
Regressors Coefficient (t-ratio) 
Intercept 7.7094 (41.14)*** 
LnPPI 0.8025 (22.37)*** 
D99 (Dummy 99=1, others=0) 0.2196 (1.4093) 
D00 (Dummy 00=1, others=0) 0.2920 (2.7762)*** 
Note:  
1. *** denotes 1% significance level 
2. Optimal Lag: ARDL (2, 1) selected based on AIC Information criteria 
 
Table 5.3  : Error Correction Representation of ARDL Model (Dependent variable:?GR) 
Regressors Coefficient (t-ratio) 
Intercept 4.3990 (5.1194)*** 
?LNGR(-1) 
?LnPPI(-1) 
D99 
D00 
ECMt-1 
-0.1984 (-1.2418) 
0.6861 (8.5122)*** 
0.1253 (1.4488) 
0.1666 (2.5008)** 
-0.5706 (-4.8711)*** 
Note:  
1. Optimal Lag selected based on AIC Information criteria  
2. ** and *** denotes 5% and 1% significance level respectively 
IV. Relationship between Real Prime Rate (RPR) and Property Price 
(LnPPI), 1997Q1 – 2002Q3 
It is sometimes argued that Hong Kong’s depressed housing market after 
1997 has to do with high real interest rates.  While there is little doubt that 
high real interest rates hurt the housing market it is important to find out 
whether high real interest rates was mainly a cause or a result of the collapse 
in housing prices.   
For this exercise we look specifically at data from 1997 to 2002.  
Because we hypothesize that the relationship after 1997 runs from housing 
prices to real interest rates through the deflationary effects of a collapse in the 
housing market, we want to focus on period after 1997.  However, the time 
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series after 1997, even though we are using quarterly data, is a bit short.  So 
we include 1997 data as a compromise. 
As can be seen in the Table 6.1, the null hypothesis can be rejected for 
the lag =3 when RPR is the dependent variable. Since the value exceeds the 
upper bound of the critical value bound, we can reject the null of no long-run 
relationship between the RPR and LnPPI.  We then take the LnPPI to be the 
dependent variable and test the joint significance of the lagged level variables 
in the EC version of the ARDL model. The results in Table 6.1 show that all 
corresponding F-statistic fall below the upper bound critical value (4.78 at 
10% significance level).  Therefore the null hypothesis of non-existence of 
cointegration cannot be rejected. The above results indicate that only F (RPR | 
LnPPI) is significant and therefore there exists a unique long-run-relationship 
when the RPR as the dependent variable and LnPPI can be treated as the 
“long-run” forcing variables for the explanation of RPR.  
The estimated long-run coefficients and the error correction 
representation selected by the AIC information criteria are reported in the 
Table 6.2 and 6.3 respectively (the maximum lag orders set at 4). The LnPPI 
carries the significant expected sign, and the error term in the EC-ARDL 
model is negative and highly significant, confirming our earlier hypothesis 
that cointegration exists between the variables.  
 
Table 6.1 : F-Statistics for Testing the Existence of a Long-Run Relationship Between Real 
Prime Rate and Property Price, 1997Q1 to 2002Q3 
Dependent 
Variables: 
Lag=1 Lag=2 Lag=3 Lag=4 Lag=5 Lag=6 
?RPR 1.83 2.20 5.19* 3.03 1.82 3.54 
?LnPPI 0.47 1.90 0.18 2.20 3.22 4.23 
Note:  
1. The critical value bounds for the test are 4.94 – 5.73 at the 95% significance level and 4.04 - 4.78 at the 
90% significance level, which are given in Table C1.iii (with an unrestricted intercept and no trend; 
number of regressor=1), Shin and Smith (1999). 
2. * denotes 10% significance level. 
 
Table 6.2 Estimated Long-Run Coefficients (Dependent Variable: RPR) 
Regressors Coefficient (t-ratio) 
Intercept 53.82 (3.66)*** 
LnPPI -8.18 (-3.07)*** 
Note:  
1. *** denotes 1% significance level 
2. Optimal Lag: ARDL (4, 0) selected based on AIC Information criteria 
 
23 
Table 6.3 : Error Correction Representation of ARDL Model (Dependent variable:?RPR) 
Regressors Coefficient (t-ratio) 
Intercept 16.0188 (2.1711)** 
?RPR(-1) 
?RPR(-2) 
?RPR(-3) 
?LnPPI 
ECMt-1 
0.1236(0.7416) 
0.2460(1.4104) 
0.6705(3.8501)*** 
-2.4347(-1.988)** 
-0.2977(-3.2169)*** 
Note:  
1. Optimal Lag: ARDL (4, 0) selected based on AIC Information criteria  
2. ** and *** denotes 5% and 1% significance level respectively 
V. Conclusions 
It is widely believed that Hong Kong’s housing market boom before 
1997 is in part due to the restriction of land supply under the Sino-British 
Joint Declaration, and in part due to the inflow of Chinese capital, 
particularly illicit capital, searching for short term speculative profits.  It is 
also widely believed that “factor price equalization” played a role in the 
collapse of the housing market after 1997.  But none of these theories had 
been tested statistically or even examined carefully.   
The collapse of Hong Kong’s housing market is too sudden for the 
factor price equalisation theory to hold, and there is just no evidence that 
there was an articially created shortage of housing before 1997.  For obvious 
reasons there is no data on the amount of illicit capital that came to Hong 
Kong from the Mainland.  But according to Mr. Wong Leung Sing of the 
Research Department of Centaline Property Agency Ltd., a name search 
among home buyers had produced only a very low percentage of names with 
Putonghua spelling.  Mainlanders could, of course, participate in the local 
housing market under the guise of registered Hong Kong companies.  But 
the percentage of buyers in the housing market that are companies have 
always been well below 10 per cent, and that includes mostly genuine Hong 
Kong-based companies.  So while Mainland buyers were indeed a player, 
particularly in the luxury homes market, there was little evidence that at any 
given time they were major players.  In any case one cannot identify a 
reversal in Chinese capital after 1997 that could compare with the reversal 
following the 16-point austerity programme of Pemier Zhu Rongji in 1993.10     
                                                 
10 According to the Hang Seng Monthly Economic Report of February 1996, “Over the past two 
years, the severe austerity measures taken by China has resulted in a dramatic shrinkage in the flow 
of funds to Hong Kong.  Early 1990s, investors from the Mainland were active in Hong Kong’s 
property market, bolstering housing prices and rents.  With the departure of this capital activity in 
the property market has slowed down….” 
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In this paper, we have presented a model that explained the movement in 
housing prices very well.  Not only did the model track movements before 
1998 but it also predicted a major correction to take place in 1998.  However, 
we identified a structural change in the first quarter of 1998, which is in 
agreement with our hypothesis as to how the public housing privatization 
programme called the Tenants Purchase Scheme damaged the flow in the 
housing market. 
We found housing providing a key transmission mechanism between 
exports performance and the domestic economy.  Movements in housing 
prices directly drive domestic demand, as well as government revenues and 
government expenditures in Hong Kong.  We have also found a close, 
bi-directional relationship between employment growth and housing prices. 
It will be useful to test this framework on the data in other countries to 
assess if it has generality.   
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Appendix 1. Variable Definition 
 
Variables 
 
 
Description 
 
Data Sources 
INFL Inflation Rate (CPI A, year on year 
change, 3 month moving average) 
Monthly Statistical Bulletin, 
various issues, Hong Kong 
Monetary Authority 
LnD Log of domestic private demand = Log of 
(Private Consumption + Private 
construction + Machinery & Equipment) 
(current price) 
Hong Kong GDP estimates 
2001, Hong Kong Census 
and Statistics Dept 
LnEX Log total exports of goods and services Hong Kong GDP estimates 
2001, Hong Kong Census 
and Statistics Dept 
LnG Log of government consumption 
expenditure (current price) 
Hong Kong GDP estimates 
2001, Hong Kong Census 
and Statistics Dept 
LnPPI Log property price index (overall private 
domestic housing market) 1989=100 
Hong Kong Monthly Digest 
of Statistics, Hong Kong 
Census and Statistics Dept 
PR Prime Rate (3 month period moving 
average) 
Monthly Statistical Bulletin, 
various issues, Hong Kong 
Monetary Authority 
RPR Prime Rate – Inflation Rate (CPI A, year 
on year change) 
Monthly Statistical Bulletin, 
various issues, Hong Kong 
Monetary Authority, and; 
Hong Kong Monthly Digest 
of Statistics, Hong Kong 
Census and Statistics Dept 
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Appendix 2. Summary of Statistical Results from Tests Performed 
Test Before 1997 After 1997 Where reported 
Test relationship 
between exports and 
home prices 
Exports drive home 
prices, ARDL model 
Actual values 
diverge from 
predicted values 
increasingly over 
time 
See Appendix available 
from the author. 
Test relationship 
between domestic 
demand and home 
prices 
Domestic demand movements do not cause 
home price movements. 
Home price movements cause domestic 
demand swings. (Granger/Johansen and 
ARDL) 
See Appendix available 
from the author. 
Test relationship 
between government 
expenditures and home 
prices 
Home prices drive government expenditures, 
ARDL model. 
See Appendix available 
from the author. 
Test relationship 
between lower tier 
home prices and higher 
tier home prices 
Lower-tier home prices typically drive higher 
tier home prices but not the other way round. 
Ho, Haurin, and Wong 
(2003). 
Test relationship 
between lower tier 
home transactions and 
higher tier home 
transactions 
Lower-tier home transactions typically drive 
higher tier home prices but not the other way 
round. 
Ho, Haurin, and Wong 
(2003) 
Test relationship 
between Second Hand 
Private Home 
Transactions and 
Home Ownership 
Scheme “free market 
transactions” 
Very significant positive relation found. Yeung (2001), p.65. 
Test causes of plunge 
in second hand home 
transactions 
Regression shows Tenants Purchase Scheme 
has more significant and greater impact on 
second hand home transactions than the Asian 
Financial Crisis, lending credence to the 
hypothesis that TPS played a key role in 
“freezing” the housing market turnover. 
Ho, Tse, and Wong 
(2003) 
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Appendix 3. Relative Trade Performance of Hong Kong before and after 1997 
 Merchandise Exports 
Cumulative 
Growth Rates  Services Exports 
Cumulative 
Growth Rates 
 
1998- 
2001 
1994- 
1997 
% of Prior 
Performance 
1998- 
2001 
1994- 
1997 
% of Prior 
Performance 
Hong Kong 9.27% 24.25% 38% 18.93% 23.67% 80% 
Japan 4.01% 6.03% 67% 3.03% 20.01% 15% 
Korea 13.70% 41.82% 33% 19.23% 56.71% 34% 
Malaysia 19.94% 33.81% 59% 23.11% 69.23% 33% 
Philippines 9.24% 87.03% 11% -58.51% 124.18% -47% 
Singapore 10.79% 29.08% 37% 38.36% 32.53% 118% 
Taipei 10.85% 30.37% 36% 21.88% 29.78% 73% 
       
USA 7.13% 34.35% 21% 10.66% 28.29% 38% 
Canada 21.24% 29.66% 72% 7.88% 32.37% 24% 
France 0.38% 20.58% 2% -5.13% 7% -73% 
Germany 5.02% 20.13% 25% -1.38% 34.23% -4% 
UK -0.13% 36.73% 0% 2.84% 41.91% 7% 
Brazil 13.85% 21.70% 64% 23.10% 13.93% 166% 
World 12.11% 30.00% 40% 8.74% 27.61% 32% 
Source: World Trade Organization, International Trade Statistics: Exports 1991-2001. 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/statis_e.htm
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